


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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC



Confidential

5 JULY 1973

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U. S. - S O V I E T S U M M I T

MOSCOW STRESSES U.S.-USSR COOPERATION AS BASIS FOR PEACE

In keeping with the historic significance it has ascribed to the summit agreements, the Soviet Union has placed new stress in the aftermath on the joint nature of the responsibilities the two countries have undertaken to insure the successful realization of the prospects these agreements have opened up. In so doing it has come very close to implying that international security is as much a function of U.S.-Soviet cooperation as of its own unilateral efforts -- a proposition that makes sense as a hedge against possible disappointments, but one which also reflects a departure from the traditional class analysis of international relations. It is perhaps in recognition of this that Moscow has shown concern to reassure its allies that its actions at the summit were consistent both with their interests and with its own responsibilities as a socialist state and as a champion of peace.

This description of the factors governing the prospects for world peace was presented in two important official documents: a statement approving the results of the summit conference issued on 29 June and signed by the Politburo, the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and a PRAVDA editorial of 2 July, reporting and commenting on the same events. Noting that Soviet-American relations had previously been a source of discord in international relations, these documents pointed out that the recent favorable development of these relations now serves as an "important element in the radical improvement of the international situation." They concluded that the faithful implementation by both sides of the commitments that had been undertaken "is the condition for turning Soviet-American relations into a permanent factor of international peace and for insuring the irreversibility of the process of relaxation."

Moscow's concern to reassure its allies in the socialist community and the third world in light of the new approach has been apparent throughout the visit. It was highlighted by Brezhnev's meeting with socialist ambassadors in Moscow before the visit and by Gromyko's meeting with the same group promptly upon the delegation's return. But the assurance emerges primarily through the affirmation expressed repeatedly that whatever furthers a relaxation of tension between the two nuclear superpowers must benefit the rest of the world as well.

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In its assessment of the implications of Brezhnev's visit, Moscow appeared particularly concerned to suggest that measures aimed at reducing the military confrontation might be expected to follow on the heels of the Washington summit, particularly in Europe. Drawing on language in the joint communique, PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA editorials on 27 June both emphasized that the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war and other results of the summit meant that "political relaxation is now being supplemented by military relaxation." Gromyko revealed the most immediate focus of that assessment in his opening remarks at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki on 3 July as he linked it with "confidence-building" measures to be applied to forces in Europe.

Notably absent in the aftermath of the summit was any public concern about the ideological consequences of the alteration in the international situation. There was no mention of a continuing struggle in the ideological realm nor was there a suggestion that capitalism and socialism were still arrayed against each other around the world. Though the joint party-government statement asserted that the USSR will continue to oppose resolutely any "intrigues of aggressive imperialist forces," these words appeared to be aimed at political forces within Western states, not at the states themselves.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

USSR, ALLIES SEEK STATUS QUO APPROVAL, QUICK SECOND PHASE

Moscow and its orthodox East European allies, in the opening statements* at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on 3 and 4 July, have clearly revealed their goal of gaining general recognition of the postwar status quo by pointedly stressing the importance of the principle of the inviolability of borders. GDR Foreign Minister Winzer on the 4th went so far as to urge that the conference give "multilateral confirmation" to the postwar "territorial realities."

USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko used his position as leadoff speaker at the conference to table the Soviet draft "Declaration on the Fundamentals of European Security and Principles of Relations between States in Europe" and to outline in general terms the principles that should guide interstate relations in Europe. On the divisive issue of cooperation in the humanitarian and cultural areas, Gromyko asserted that cooperation in this sphere must respect the principles of sovereignty and noninterference and that departure from these principles would be "justly regarded as an attempt to intervene in the affairs of others." The TASS summary of Gromyko's speech did not cite his remark, noted in Western press accounts, which urged "strict observance of the laws, customs, and traditions of each other" and declared that the USSR "will proceed from this" basis.

In what appeared to be a desire to conclude the work of the conference as rapidly as possible, Gromyko called for the convocation of its third phase at the "summit" level "toward the end" of 1973. Similarly, Bulgaria's Mladenov on the 4th, according to BTA, said the conference's second phase should begin in the first half of September. Perhaps with an eye to Brezhnev's stopover in Paris and with West European sensitivities in mind, Moscow had downplayed the statement in the Brezhnev-Nixon communique which said the two governments would work for a rapid conclusion of the CSCE and foresaw the possibility of

* The speeches of all the Soviet bloc foreign ministers are currently available, in text or summary form, except for that of Budapest's Janos Peter.

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completing the conference "at the highest level." The 29 June Soviet party-government statement approving the Brezhnev-Nixon talks and the 2 July PRAVDA editorial, for example, totally ignored the call for a summit-level meeting to wrap up the CSCE.

The foreign ministers' speeches displayed a clear division of labor among Moscow and its allies, with the USSR advancing its draft of general principles on European security, the GDR and Hungary offering a draft proposal on economic and technological cooperation, Poland and Bulgaria offering a draft document on human contacts, and Czechoslovakia outlining a detailed plan for permanent post-conference machinery in the form of a "consultative committee." In an obvious reference to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Poland's Olszowski declared on the 3d that "we will also have to eliminate the still existing mechanism of subversive propaganda set up in the period of the cold war."

FORCE REDUCTION TALKS In his Helsinki address, Gromyko followed the general line of down-playing the issue of force reductions in Europe. He dropped the words "associated measures" from his description of the formal negotiations that are to begin 30 October, calling them "talks on reduction of armed forces and armaments in the area of central Europe." Stressing the familiar theme, Gromyko said that all participants in the Vienna talks must accept the principle of "undiminished security" for all.

Following the issuance of the Brezhnev-Nixon communique, which contained the announcement that the Vienna talks on force reductions would start on 30 October, Moscow has not sought to exploit the elimination of "balanced" from the formal nomenclature of the talks. Moscow apparently is seeking to allay suspicions openly voiced in the West European press that the agreement to start the force reduction talks in October was part of a deal to get Washington's agreement to a CSCE summit. It is noteworthy in this connection that the 29 June Soviet party-government statement on the summit avoided comment on the force reduction issue.

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CHINA

NUCLEAR TEST ANNOUNCEMENT REFLECTS GESTURE TO UNITED STATES

Peking's 28 June announcement of its nuclear test on the 27th conveyed a conciliatory gesture to the United States while reflecting Chinese wariness toward arms control negotiations that might inhibit the PRC's nuclear program. Again using the short format adopted in November 1971, the latest announcement repeated the statement in the last previous one (on 9 January 1972) that the PRC conducts "necessary and limited" nuclear tests for the purpose of "breaking the nuclear monopoly" of the superpowers, but it omitted the previous announcement's explicit reference to "nuclear blackmail" by "two" superpowers. Given Peking's intransigent stance toward the Soviets compared with its mild treatment of U.S. policies, these omissions may be seen as a good-will gesture to Washington.

Against the background of the recent U.S.-Soviet summit, and particularly the agreements on SALT and prevention of nuclear war, another notable omission is the failure to repeat the previous announcement's assertion of Peking's readiness to attend "a world conference" to discuss the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, to reach an agreement on nonuse of nuclear weapons. That offer contained a hint of flexibility--earlier intimated in Chiao Kuan-hua's UNGA address the previous November--by relaxing Peking's longstanding proposal for a world "summit" conference on nuclear disarmament. In reiterating Peking's summit conference proposal in his 24 November 1971 speech, Chiao indicated that the Chinese "are also prepared to hear and consider different opinions" on the level at which a world conference would take place.

The omission of the proposal on a world disarmament conference may reflect Peking's concern over the agreements in the nuclear field reached at the U.S.-Soviet summit. Last year's UNGA session had witnessed a bitter Sino-Soviet contest over Moscow's proposals on a world disarmament conference and nonuse of force, and the Chinese may now feel that it is no time to show flexibility. However, in keeping with Peking's line that the nuclear powers undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the 28 June announcement repeated the standard Chinese pledge not to be the first to use these weapons. It also reiterated the Chinese desire to "work together with the other peoples and all other countries that love peace and uphold justice" in the struggle to achieve the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

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MOSCOW Characteristically, Moscow reacted to the Chinese test by publicizing protests from other countries. Though usually cautious about placing Chinese developments in a triangular context, Moscow has been increasingly blunt in counterposing the test to the recently signed U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of nuclear war. A broadcast to Southeast Asia on 2 July cited foreign comment that called the test a "diplomatic maneuver to intentionally show China's negative attitude toward the treaty on prevention of nuclear war." The bulk of Moscow's comment on the test has treated it as a glaring contradiction to the general trend toward international detente. A Soviet broadcast to China on the 28th contrasted worldwide recognition of the summit's contributions to peace with the outrage caused by the Chinese test. The Chinese listeners were told that the test will have serious repercussions internationally and will harm the PRC's international prestige.

Moscow's Polish and Czechoslovak allies were more direct in drawing the international implications of the test. The Polish press agency PAP, for example, called the test Peking's "comment" on the U.S.-Soviet summit.

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INDOCHINA

In the wake of the joint communique signed in Paris on 13 June, Vietnamese communist propaganda has indicated no modification of the PRG's basic differences with Saigon over the future course of a settlement in South Vietnam. When the Paris consultative conference sessions were resumed on 28 June--after a month's hiatus--there was no sign that either side would retreat from political positions set forth last April. Moreover, the PRG has continued to charge that the Saigon regime has failed to observe the cease-fire, citing as evidence major military operations in Kontum and Chuong Thien provinces.

The 13 June communique signed by the United States and the three Vietnamese parties did alleviate some problems between Washington and Hanoi, allowing the resumption of their joint economic talks and U.S. minesweeping operations in North Vietnamese waters. However, Hanoi has complained that not all the mine-clearing provisions are being implemented and that weekly liaison flights between Saigon and Hanoi have been canceled. At the same time, the United States continues to be assailed for failing to urge Saigon's implementation of the peace accord and for allegedly violating the communique with its continued bombing in Cambodia.

Sihanouk returned to Peking on the 5th after completing a two-month tour of Africa and Europe. His return came in a setting of new Sino-U.S. contacts and a 15 August deadline for U.S. military actions in Cambodia.

PRG POLITICAL PLATFORM ELABORATED AT MEETING WITH GVN

The session of the GVN-PRG consultative conference on 28 June was the first since 31 May when the weekly meetings were suspended pending the results of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks. At the 14th session on the 28th, PRG chief delegate Nguyen Van Hieu complained particularly about the GVN's failure to recognize the PRG as a legitimate rival administration.

Hieu recounted the PRG's six-point proposal for a settlement which had been introduced at the 8th session of the consultative conference on 25 April. In some of the points, Hieu only modified the language to accord with the 13 June Paris communique. For example, point one in the April proposal called for an "immediate"

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cease-fire, but the first point in Hieu's statement on the 28th calls for the strict observance of the communique's 14 June cease-fire deadline. But in some other instances, Hieu's elaborations in effect resurrected proposals from the communist negotiating package prior to the Paris agreement which had been vehemently opposed by the GVN. Saigon proposals at the session, for the formation of subcommittees to deal with various problems and for a timetable leading to elections in December, were promptly rejected by the PRG.

Following the outline of the 25 April six-point proposal, Hieu offered the following variations on the PRG position:

+ The second point, dealing with the return of prisoners, cited the call in the 13 June communique for the return of all detained personnel--within 45 days, if possible--and for the inspection of detention sites by national Red Cross societies. Hieu did not repeat the April proposal's specific points defining such personnel in broad terms as those associated with the PRG and those "belonging to neither side, captured and detained for having struggled for peace, independence, better living conditions, and democracy, as well as all other persons captured during the war." Despite this omission, presumably the communists' demands for the release of large numbers of civilian prisoners stand: Hieu's statement, like the joint communique, endorsed the broad definition of such prisoners offered in Article 7 of the protocol on prisoners in the January peace agreement. Article 7 accepted the description of civilian prisoners in the 1954 Geneva agreement as "persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party."

Differences between Saigon and the communists on the definition of prisoners to be released continue to be pointed up in the propaganda; a 4 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, for example, deplored reports in the Western press that Saigon has denied it holds any political prisoners and repeated the charge that 200,000 to 300,000 such prisoners are incarcerated in the South.

Following point two, Hieu noted that the cease-fire and prisoner questions fall under the purview of the two-party Joint Military Commission (JMC), but added that: "in case of a hinderance which necessitates settlement at a higher level, the consultative conference between the two South Vietnamese parties will discuss it and find a solution in time." Presumably the conference would, under this guideline, consider these two points, since the communists

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claim that Saigon is not implementing the cease-fire and that it is blocking JMC action on the prisoner issue. On the latter point, a 29 June Liberation Radio broadcast charged that Saigon's "delays and evasions" at a series of four JMC subcommittee meetings, from 16 to 27 June, prohibited progress in the return of prisoners and the invitation of Polish and Canadian Red Cross societies to visit prisons.

+ Point three, detailing the PRG's interpretation of "liberties" which should be guaranteed under Article 11 of the Paris accord, drew a clear battleline on the most crucial of these liberties. Going beyond the general listing of reforms demanded in the April PRG proposal, the current one included a specific call for the two parties to publish a "decision" (quyeets dqinhj) on "allowing all persons of all political and religious tendencies to freely carry out their activity in the two zones" and "allowing the free circulation of papers of all tendencies between the two zones." The PRG's determination to acquire guarantees that it can freely pursue a political struggle throughout the South was underlined in concluding "concrete proposals" offered by Hieu. His first suggestion was that the "two governments" in the South "make public immediately a law (sawcs linhj) fully guaranteeing the exercise of democratic liberties" as specified in the peace agreement, the joint communique, and his statement.

+ Hieu's fourth point, on the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, went far beyond the April proposal which had done little more than reiterate the stipulation of the Paris accord that the three-part Council would promote the implementation of the agreement, the achievement of national reconciliation, and the insurance of liberties, and would organize general elections. In his current statement, Hieu defined the functions of the council within this broad charter so as to give it virtually the powers of a coalition government with authority over the two South Vietnamese contenders. Thus, for example, Hieu specified that the Council would assume the task of promoting the application of the cease-fire provisions of the agreement and that the two parties would have to submit reports to it on the implementation of the agreement. He went even further with regard to the stipulation of the agreement on democratic liberties, suggesting that the Council would "follow and control" the implementation of these provisions, "prevent violations" and investigate and seek solutions for violations when they occur, and "promote" the abolition of policies and laws contrary to provisions of the agreement.

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Hieu also discussed the formation of the Council in his fourth point. He did not specify how the third component of the Council should be chosen, but noted that it must be composed in such a way as to ensure that political and religious tendencies which do not side with either party "have their voices heard," be really representative, and play an "independent and equal role within the council." Hieu suggested that the Council be composed of 36 members and have a presidium of six members. He insisted that it be guaranteed total security and all facilities to discharge its tasks. Whereas the GVN delegate at the 23 June session suggested that the Council be convened by 11 September, Hieu underlined its importance with a suggestion that it be functioning by the end of July. Hieu left the timing of the formation of councils at lower levels up to the National Council, but specified that they should be formed "in all administrative units: province, town, district, village, and quarter." The Paris agreement merely noted on this point that the two South Vietnamese parties would consult about the formation of councils at lower levels.

4 The fifth point of the PRG proposal last April merely recalled previous proposals for the election of a constituent assembly and then went on, in accordance with the Paris agreement, to reiterate PRG willingness to consult with the GVN on the institutions to be set up through general elections. By contrast, Hieu's 28 June statement contained no suggestion of flexibility on this point, instead stating directly that elections would be held for a constituent assembly which would work out a constitution and then proceed to form a new government. Unlike the GVN, Hieu offered no suggested timetable for the national elections, indicating as he did last April that they should occur after an effective cease-fire has been observed and democratic liberties ensured.

Prior to the 25 April proposal, the PRG had not publicly advocated that the elections be for a constituent assembly since the first week of October, before the start of the U.S.-DRV negotiations leading to the Paris agreement. Hieu's stronger stance on this issue in his 28 June statement would appear to represent a hardening of the PRG position on this critical question. In a press conference statement after the 28 June meeting, carried in VNA's service transmission from Paris to Hanoi, Hieu pointed up PRG differences with Saigon on this point, accusing the GVN of "plotting" to carry out an election "farce" within the framework of "its constitution, fascist laws, and coercive machine."

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Hieu also ignored the Paris agreement's stipulation that the two parties would agree upon what local elections were to be held: He specified, unlike the April proposal, that "local elections shall be organized to name the councils of representatives of provinces, towns, district, and villages and wards throughout South Vietnam."

+ Point six in the 28 June Hieu statement amplified upon the similar point in the April proposal, which had repeated Article 13 of the Paris agreement stipulating that the two sides should settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in the South and that their discussions would include such questions as measures to reduce military effectives and to demobilize troops being reduced. Hieu's current statement however, gave less weight to the question of troop reduction--the portion of the Paris accord which the GVN views as covering the question of the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. Instead he stressed the need for the two sides to guarantee that their forces observe the cease-fire and demanded an end to forcible conscription and the reinforcement of regular units by the transfer of paramilitary forces.

By contrast, the GVN proposal at the 28 June meeting included the reduction of forces--i.e., North Vietnamese withdrawal--in its timetable for a settlement, suggesting that it begin at the end of July and be completed by 11 September. A 30 June NHAN DAN editorial on the PRG statement scored this Saigon proposal, claiming that the GVN was raising a point which had been rejected in the Paris accord and that the GVN was dodging the implementation of democratic rights by trying to connect this question with the "unreasonable" question of withdrawing non-South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam.

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SIHANOUK RETURNS TO PEKING AFTER TWO-MONTH FOREIGN TOUR

In a setting of new Sino-U.S. contacts and a 15 August deadline for U.S. military action in Indochina, Cambodian Prince Sihanouk returned to Peking on 5 July after completing a two-month tour of African and European countries in his quest for added diplomatic leverage. He was greeted on his return by a Chinese leadership turnout headed by Chou En-lai. Sihanouk and his government (RGNU) have not responded authoritatively to the swirl of speculation over possible negotiations on a Cambodian settlement. Sustaining their time-marking approach of recent weeks, Sihanouk and the insurgent leaders have avoided renewing the strident denunciations of "sham peace maneuvers" that had marked their reaction to earlier speculation about a settlement in the wake of the Vietnam agreement and during the Kissinger-Tho talks in May.

Sihanouk's last major statement on the Cambodian situation, in a speech at a banquet given by Romanian President Ceausescu in Bucharest on 22 June and carried by NCNA, reaffirmed RGNU positions in general terms. He again chided the Nixon Administration for rejecting his proposal for bilateral talks on the pattern of the U.S.-DRV negotiations, affirmed the insurgents' resolve to restore peace in Cambodia on the basis of "total independence, national unity, and territorial integrity" and the recovery of rights "usurped" by the Lon Nol government, and declared again that the Cambodian question would be solved "once the United States stops giving military aid and air protection to the puppet Lon Nol regime."

Stock affirmations of the insurgents' line have also been contained in two recent RGNU statements criticizing the United States and Saigon. A 29 June statement by the RGNU Information and Propaganda Ministry underscored the insurgents' resolve to "undergo all sacrifices" in order to achieve the goals set forth in Sihanouk's March 1970 five-point declaration, and it expressed a determination "to topple the traitors Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, and In Tam" and "to chase the U.S. imperialists, the Saigon puppets and other lackeys out of Cambodia." A 30 June RGNU Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, seconding an earlier PRG allegation of U.S.-Saigon violations of the 13 June Paris communique, pledged to continue the struggle "without compromise nor flinching" until the five points are achieved.

Though there has been no repetition of the earlier spate of attacks on moves toward a negotiated settlement, an undercurrent of persisting suspicion regarding American efforts to promote

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negotiations has been reflected in occasional low-level comment and, most notably, in a 24 June statement issued in the name of the RGNU by the leading in-country insurgent leader, Khieu Samphan.* Appealing for world support against U.S. military attacks and moves to promote a compromise peace settlement, the statement denounced President Nixon and Kissinger by name for "openly and clandestinely" conducting a "Munich-style" maneuver designed to place the blame for the continuing Cambodian war on the FUNK while mustering international partners to force the Cambodian people "to lay down their weapons and surrender to the U.S. Imperialists and their lackeys." The statement did not specify which states were allegedly assisting the United States, but seemed to exonerate China and North Vietnam by expressing "sincere thanks" for their support. That the Soviet Union remains a target for criticism was indicated by an AKI commentary on 1 July that alluded to the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in an unfavorable light. Citing a Western press report, it said that "R. Nixon recently made a compromise with a superpower on the European security question, and with this, assumed the right to continue his bombing of Cambodia."

FOREIGN SUPPORT Chinese coverage of Cambodian developments has been limited largely to replays of RGNU pronouncements, including the text of the 30 June RGNU Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement and a shorter version of Khieu Samphan's 24 June statement. Peking also reported on PRG and DRV Foreign Ministry statements in support of Khieu Samphan's appeal but issued no supporting comment in its own name. Its only recent authoritative comment was contained in the customary PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking Sihanouk's return to Peking on the 5th which hailed his foreign tour as a "great event" that has reaffirmed and strengthened the international position of the RGNU as "the sole legal government of Cambodia." Calling attention to the "new situation" in Cambodia brought about by the insurgents' battle victories in the wake of Sihanouk's tour of the interior in March, the editorial highlighted Sihanouk's condemnation of U.S. "aggression" and reaffirmed Chinese support for his "just" five-point stand on a peace settlement. It characterized the insurgents as having "firmly grasped the initiative on the battlefield," while "huddled in the isolated city of Phnom Penh, the traitorous Lon Nol clique is in dire

* The FUNK radio on 26 June said the statement was released on the 24th; subsequent Chinese and Vietnamese pickups of the statement dated it 10 days earlier, on 14 June.

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straita. Its days are numbered." Unlike RGNU statements, Peking avoids attacking the other three members of the ruling four-man Phnom Penh political council.

In what may be a sign of Chinese flexibility, NCNA's reports on President Nixon's 27 June veto of legislation calling for an immediate end to U.S. military action in Cambodia and his subsequent signing of the compromise bill setting the 15 August deadline gave considerable play to the President's stress on achieving a Cambodian settlement. Both the 28 June and 2 July NCNA reports cited the President's contention that a sudden cutoff of U.S. support would **destroy chances for a negotiated settlement**, and NCNA quoted him as saying a responsible settlement in Indochina remains a matter of greatest urgency. The 2 July report also noted his assertion that he would request Congress to help if after 15 August further actions were needed to achieve peace.

The 29 June PRG and 3 July DRV Foreign Ministry statements responding to Khieu Samphan's 24 June appeal duly demanded an end to U.S. bombing and military actions, and the DRV also endorsed Sihanouk's five points. DRV Premier Pham Van Dong in a 1 July joint communique marking his visit to North Korea underscored Kanoi's support for Sihanouk as "head of state" and "the legitimate, genuine, and consistent representative of the state of Cambodia," and demanded that the Cambodian problem be settled on the basis of the five points. A 4 July NHAN DAN commentary on Sihanouk's trip abroad also lauded the prince and hailed the rising international prestige of the RGNU as "the legal and sole authentic government" of Cambodia. Other low-level Vietnamese comment has criticized the President's 27 June veto decision and has assessed the 15 August deadline as an Administration "scheme" and "delaying tactic" designed to buy time to cope with Congressional opposition.

In contrast, Moscow seized on the signing of the compromise bill as a sign of the end of U.S. involvement. A 1 July Soviet report quoted Senator Fulbright's observation that "this decision will finally end" U.S. intervention in Indochina. At the same time, Moscow has taken a further step toward acknowledging Sihanouk's claims to legitimacy in what may be a move to help foster a negotiated settlement in Cambodia. In early June, TASS had carried the first Soviet reports on the prince's foreign tour by taking note of his stops in Algeria and Yugoslavia. These reports marked the first mention of Sihanouk in Soviet media since the signing of the Vietnam agreement. In keeping with Moscow's

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recognition of the Lon Nol government, the reports in early June made no reference to Sihanouk's claim to be head of state, but a 29 June TASS report on his visit to Romania did so indirectly by citing the Romanian agency AGERPRES' reference to the prince as "head of state of Cambodia."

Soviet reports on the military situation also seem somewhat more forthcoming in acknowledging the insurgents' position. TASS accounts on 20 June and 4 July noted that "the patriotic forces" firmly "hold the initiative," and a 3 July report favorably compared living conditions in the "liberated areas" with those in territory under the control of "the Phnom Penh authorities."

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U S S R

POLYANSKIY ENDORSES MOLDAVIAN KOLKHOZ COUNCIL EXPERIMENT

CPSU Politburo member and USSR Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy has apparently endorsed the Moldavian experiment in transferring management of kolkhozes and interkolkhoz organizations from the agriculture ministry to kolkhoz councils.* Polyanskiy's attitude toward the controversial innovation was revealed in a report on the 5 March session of the All Union Council of Kolkhozes published in the June issue of the agriculture ministry's journal ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE. According to the report, Polyanskiy discussed the Moldavian experiment in his inaugural address to the council as chairman. He evidently viewed the experiment favorably since the report based on his remarks drew the conclusion that the Moldavian innovation was "a very important state experiment," the results of which "will help more correctly determine the path for future improvement of the leadership of kolkhoz production."

Polyanskiy's attitude toward the Moldavian innovation has been unclear. Although he endorsed a similar "kolkhoz union" scheme in 1959, he has not addressed the subject since. In addition, as agriculture minister he presumably might have opposed the Moldavian innovation since, if applied nationally, it would strip the agriculture ministry of most of its power. His predecessor, Matskevich, a longtime kolkhoz union foe, visited Moldavia in January to observe its agricultural innovations and, perhaps because of his continued resistance, was soon afterward removed and sent to Czechoslovakia as ambassador.

In an early March speech Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul had clearly indicated that under his plan the agriculture ministry will be reduced to handling agricultural science and services. In a 31 May RADYANSKA UKRAINA interview Bodyul disclosed that rayon agricultural administrations--formerly the key link in agricultural management--have been reduced to small rayon departments and that kolkhozes have been subordinated to the republic council of ministers instead of the agriculture ministry.

Despite Polyanskiy's stress on the importance of the experiment, publicity on its features in the central press has been limited solely to a 24 March RURAL LIFE article, and opposition has persisted at the republic level. A January KOMMUNIST ESTONII article by

* For background, see the TRENDS of 14 March 1973, pages 25-26.

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M. Bronshteyn praised coordination of kolkhozes and sovkhoses by rayon agricultural administrations and, while insisting that Estonia is not opposed to experiments, warned that new forms of interkolkhoz cooperation cannot be applied to the entire country at once. The Estonians have long been outspoken foes of kolkhoz unions and defenders of the agriculture ministry and its local agencies.

UZBEK GOSPLAN CHIEF DEFENDS REPUBLIC INTERESTS

Proposals by central ministry officials to reduce the rights of union republics in the formulation of economic plans have been countered by the head of Uzbek Gosplan.* Writing in ECONOMIC GAZETTE No. 26 for 25 June, S. K. Ziyadullayev defended the practice of balancing branch plans with territorial plans as an "effective means for implementing the Leninist nationality policy" and as a means of preventing a "narrow departmental approach." Criticizing a number of central ministries for violating regulations by sending incomplete and late draft plans to republic planners and by changing plans without informing the republics, Ziyadullayev proposed that republic officials attend Gosplan sessions considering draft plans affecting their respective republics.

* For background on the movement to reduce republics' rights see the TRENDS of 23 May 1973, pages 17-19.

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NOTES

CHINESE PARTY ANNIVERSARY: In its treatment of the CCP's anniversary on 1 July Peking continued its practice since the 1971 Lin Piao affair of scaling down anniversary celebrations and departing from patterns followed during the cultural revolution. As such, this practice confirms trends toward normalization and away from cultural revolution behavior. As in 1972, Peking marked the party anniversary only by printing a large picture of Mao in the papers and by carrying a number of articles on progress in building the party. Last year most of the leaders appeared at an athletic tournament on 1 July to mark the 20th anniversary of a Mao inscription on promoting physical culture, and there was a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 6 July dealing with cadres' study of Marxist theory since the crucial second plenum.

The party anniversary has never ranked with National Day or May Day as an occasion for leadership appearances, nor did it occasion major editorials prior to the cultural revolution. Judging from the practice since Lin's fall, PEOPLE'S DAILY-RED FLAG-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY joint editorials may be expected as a matter of course only on New Year's Day, Army Day, and National Day, while regular leadership appearances have been reduced to May Day and National Day.

CHINA AGRICULTURE: Continuing problems with this year's grain harvest and grain supply shortages resulting from last year's shortfalls were indicated by a 28 June broadcast from Shantung province which asked commune members to retain less grain than usual this summer and make up the difference in the fall. Production teams were encouraged to sell more to the state now on the grounds that they would be paid now for their summer crop and the funds they thus receive can "contribute to a bumper harvest in the autumn."

SINKIANG LEADERSHIP: A Sinkiang leadership turnout on 3 July to greet Sihanouk on his return to China has revealed the appointment of Saifudin as new Sinkiang first secretary, revolutionary committee chairman, and military first political commissar. Saifudin has been the leading figure there since former first secretary and military region commander Lung Shu-chin dropped from public view in early 1972 in the wake of Lin Piao's fall. The NCNA account of the arrival also named Yang Yung, former Peking military region commander purged during

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the cultural revolution, as the Sinkiang commander and second secretary. Yang reappeared as a "responsible person" in the central military hierarchy last summer. In other changes reflected in the NCNA account, party secretary Tsao Ssu-ming, who was the senior figure in Sinkiang during Saifudin's absences in Peking for his duties as NPC vice chairman, was identified as a third secretary (making Sinkiang the first province to have this position), and Ho Lin-chao was identified as a secretary and regional deputy political commissar. The changes in Sinkiang do not affect the overwhelmingly military appearance of the border region's leadership, though political commissars rather than commanders now predominate. While Saifudin was governor of Sinkiang from 1955 until the post was abolished during the cultural revolution, he concurrently served as a deputy commander until as recently as last year.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 25 JUNE - 1 JULY 1973

<u>Moscow (2791 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1218 items)</u>		
Brezhnev Visit to U.S.	(55%)	31%	Domestic Issues	(42%)	47%
[Joint Communique	(--)	4%]	Korea	(9%)	17%
[Soviet Party-Gov-	(--)	4%]	[Kim Il-song Speech	(--)	7%]
ernment Statement			on 23d Liberation		
Brezhnev in France	(1%)	19%	Anniversary		
[Soviet Party-Gov-	(--)	4%]	Mali President in PRC	(13%)	8%
ernment Statement			Vietnam	(4%)	7%
[Joint Statement	(--)	2%]	[DRV Leaders in	(--)	3%]
China	(3%)	3%	Mongolia, DPRK		
European Security	(--)	2%	Cambodia	(5%)	4%
Conference			PRC Nuclear Test	(--)	3%
Indochina	(2%)	1%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.